Department of Justice’s Shifting Stance on Corporate Bribery Under Scrutiny Following Undisclosed $118 Million Millicom Settlement

The landscape of corporate criminal enforcement, particularly concerning the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), is undergoing a significant re-evaluation under the second Trump administration, sparking debate among legal experts, advocacy groups, and the corporate defense bar. This shifting paradigm was starkly highlighted by the resolution of a substantial $118 million bribery case involving TIGO Guatemala, a subsidiary of the telecommunications giant Millicom, which concluded on November 10, 2025, with a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) yet notably lacked a formal press release from the Department of Justice (DOJ). This silence from the DOJ, coupled with a general absence of mainstream media coverage, has amplified concerns previously voiced by organizations like Public Citizen, which on June 10, 2025, issued a press release alleging that the Department of Justice "Won’t Prosecute Corporate Bribery Schemes Overseas."

The Millicom Settlement: A Glimmer Amidst Policy Shifts

The $118 million settlement with TIGO Guatemala, a unit of Millicom, represents a significant enforcement action under the FCPA, addressing allegations of corporate bribery. The agreement, structured as a two-year deferred prosecution agreement, mandates a criminal penalty of $60 million and $58.2 million in forfeiture. This resolution stands out not only for its financial magnitude but also for the circumstances surrounding its announcement – or lack thereof. Daniel Suleiman, a partner at Covington & Burling in Washington, D.C., who represented Millicom in the case, shed light on the intricacies of the resolution and its broader implications for corporate criminal defense.

The case, which resolved allegations of illegal payments made to government officials for favors, dates back to a voluntary disclosure by Millicom in 2015. While the DOJ initially closed its investigation in 2018, new information surfaced around 2020, prompting the Department to reopen the inquiry. Millicom subsequently disclosed the receipt of a subpoena in the spring of 2022. The conduct under scrutiny occurred between approximately 2012 and 2018 at a Millicom subsidiary, prior to the parent company acquiring full operational control from its local partner in 2021.

The terms of the DPA reflected the company’s proactive measures. Millicom received a 50 percent discount off the bottom of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range, which is reportedly the highest discount ever awarded under the Department’s formalized policies. This substantial reduction in penalty, along with a shorter-than-standard two-year DPA term and the absence of an independent corporate monitor, acknowledged Millicom’s voluntary disclosure in 2015, its "exceptional cooperation" throughout the investigation, and its "very extensive remediation" efforts, including the implementation of a "top-notch compliance program." These concessions underscore the DOJ’s continued commitment to incentivizing robust internal compliance and cooperation, even as its broader enforcement priorities undergo recalibration.

The Unannounced Resolution: A Question of Transparency

One of the most perplexing aspects of the Millicom settlement was the DOJ’s decision not to issue a public press release. Typically, settlements of this scale and nature are accompanied by detailed public announcements, serving both as a deterrent to other potential offenders and as a testament to the Department’s commitment to anti-corruption efforts. The DOJ attributed this oversight to "personnel issues raised during the government shutdown," which coincided with the November 10 resolution date. However, critics point to the Department’s simultaneous release of press statements on less significant cases during the same period, suggesting that the Millicom case may have "fallen through the cracks for one reason or another," as one observer noted.

This lack of transparency fueled pre-existing concerns from advocacy groups. Public Citizen’s June 2025 press release had already articulated fears that the DOJ was retreating from aggressive prosecution of overseas corporate bribery. While the Millicom settlement seemingly contradicts the notion of a complete cessation of FCPA enforcement, its muted public profile does little to assuage worries about the administration’s commitment to maintaining a robust anti-corruption stance. For the mainstream media, including prominent outlets like The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, and The Washington Post, the absence of a DOJ announcement likely contributed to the case’s negligible coverage, leaving a significant corporate crime resolution largely unnoticed by the broader public.

A New Direction for FCPA Enforcement?

Daniel Suleiman’s insights offer a critical perspective on the evolving enforcement landscape. He observes that the "chapter is still very much being written" regarding corporate criminal defense under the current administration. A key factor, he notes, is a significant "personnel issue" within the DOJ, with many experienced prosecutors having departed, particularly from units like the FCPA section. This attrition naturally impacts the Department’s capacity and the speed at which new policy priorities can "trickle down" and be executed.

Suleiman highlights a fascinating and potentially transformative policy shift at the DOJ. He recalls that during his tenure at the Department between 2010 and 2013, arguments that FCPA enforcement harmed U.S. business interests, while decades old, appeared to have been "laid to rest" by robust enforcement. However, under the current administration, "that argument has not only been resuscitated, but enshrined in an executive order and in a Department Attorney General memo." The core thrust of these new directives, as Suleiman interprets them, suggests that investigations and prosecutions perceived to "harm U.S. business interests" may not be pursued. Instead, the focus is intended to shift towards cases threatening "U.S. national security," involving "cartels and transnational criminal organizations," or those that "otherwise disadvantage U.S. business interests."

This represents a significant philosophical departure from previous administrations, which largely viewed the FCPA as a vital tool for promoting fair competition, upholding ethical business practices globally, and strengthening the rule of law. Critics of this new approach argue that linking anti-bribery enforcement so directly to perceived national economic interests could weaken the FCPA’s universal applicability and potentially foster an environment where certain forms of corruption are tolerated if deemed beneficial to U.S. companies in the short term. It could also complicate international cooperation, as other nations might perceive the U.S. as selectively enforcing its anti-corruption laws.

The Long Arc of White-Collar Investigations

Suleiman emphasizes that the Millicom case, like many other corporate resolutions currently emerging, began "several years ago." This crucial point underscores the inherent lag in white-collar criminal investigations. These cases are notoriously complex, often involving intricate financial transactions, a multitude of documents (frequently located overseas), and interviews with numerous individuals across different jurisdictions. Such investigations "cannot be completed shortly after the policy pronouncement is made," Suleiman explains. Therefore, while the administration’s new policies may signal a future shift in priorities, many ongoing resolutions reflect the investigative efforts initiated under previous administrations.

The question then becomes: "what are these cases going to be replaced with?" As older investigations conclude, the true impact of the new policy directives will become clearer. If the DOJ indeed narrows its focus, observers anticipate a potential decline in the number of new FCPA investigations, particularly those that do not align with the newly articulated national security or specific economic disadvantage criteria. This raises concerns about whether significant bribery schemes, particularly those that do not directly involve illicit finance or pose immediate national security threats, might go unaddressed.

The Evolution of Corporate Criminal Justice: DPAs and NPAs

The Millicom settlement also exemplifies the broader shift in corporate criminal enforcement over the past four decades, moving away from traditional guilty pleas and trials towards negotiated settlements like Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs). Suleiman views this evolution as a "net positive." He explains that a guilty plea for a corporation, particularly in regulated industries, can be a "fatal deal," carrying severe reputational damage, collateral consequences, and debarment from government contracts.

DPAs, however, allow companies to be held accountable through significant financial penalties and, at times, corporate monitors, without the "stain of a felony conviction." As corporations "can’t go to prison," Suleiman argues that a guilty plea often "is not needed for a corporation" and "doesn’t add that much" to the accountability framework in many cases. NPAs, which do not involve the filing of charges in court, represent an even more lenient option, reflecting a higher degree of cooperation and remediation from the company’s perspective. This nuanced approach allows the DOJ to tailor resolutions that address corporate misconduct while preserving the viability of the entity, thereby protecting jobs and broader economic interests.

The Two-Tiered Justice Debate

The discussion inevitably circles back to the long-standing perception of a two-tiered justice system: one for individuals, particularly those who are indigent, and another for corporations. Suleiman, who also engages in pro bono work representing indigent clients, acknowledges the perception but reframes it as a disparity between "indigent individuals and individuals who can afford higher priced counsel."

He argues against a direct comparison between individual prosecutions for violent crimes and corporate criminal enforcement, calling it "comparing apples and oranges." His reasoning centers on the fundamental differences between individuals and corporations:

1. Nature of the Entity: A corporation comprises thousands of employees, many of whom are entirely unconnected to the misconduct under investigation, which might have occurred in a specific unit or subsidiary. Punishing the entire corporation with a "fatal" guilty plea can have widespread, indirect negative consequences for innocent stakeholders.
2. Incarceration: Corporations cannot be imprisoned. The primary tools for corporate accountability are financial penalties, remediation, and compliance reforms. For individuals, incarceration remains a central component of the justice system, particularly for violent offenses.

While Suleiman’s distinction highlights the practical realities of corporate entities, critics contend that the perception of leniency for corporate wrongdoers, especially when compared to the harsh penalties faced by individuals, erodes public trust in the justice system. The ability of corporations to negotiate favorable settlements, secure substantial discounts, and avoid the most severe consequences like guilty pleas, while individuals often face the full force of the law, continues to fuel this debate.

Looking Ahead

The Millicom settlement, while an important enforcement action, serves as a complex data point in a rapidly evolving legal and political landscape. Its quiet resolution, combined with explicit policy shifts within the DOJ, suggests a future where FCPA enforcement may become more selective, guided by a re-prioritization of U.S. national and economic interests. This shift poses critical questions for global anti-corruption efforts, corporate compliance strategies, and the public’s perception of equitable justice. As the "chapter is still being written," legal practitioners, policymakers, and the public will be closely watching for further indications of the new administration’s ultimate impact on corporate accountability. The efficacy of these new policies in deterring corruption, rather than merely re-directing enforcement, will be the ultimate measure of their success.