Trump Administration Loosens Restrictions on Law Enforcement Data Sharing with Intelligence Agencies, Raising Privacy Concerns

The Trump administration has significantly relaxed long-standing restrictions on the sharing of U.S. law enforcement information with the CIA and other intelligence agencies, a move that critics warn could jeopardize the privacy of American citizens. Officials familiar with the changes, who spoke on condition of anonymity, indicated that these alterations could grant intelligence agencies access to a vast database encompassing hundreds of millions of documents. This repository includes sensitive information from FBI case files, banking records, and investigations into various organizations, potentially encompassing the activities of law-abiding individuals.

Administration officials have framed these changes as a necessary step to combat transnational criminal organizations, particularly drug cartels, which have been classified as terrorist groups. The stated objective is to equip intelligence agencies with more comprehensive data from investigations conducted by the FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and other federal law enforcement bodies. However, these significant policy shifts have occurred with minimal public announcement or formal notification to Congress, and internally, the process has been characterized by a notable lack of transparency and rigorous debate among government lawyers.

"None of this has been thought through very carefully – which is shocking," one intelligence official stated, reflecting a sentiment shared by others concerned about the implications of expanded information sharing. "There are a lot of privacy concerns out there, and nobody really wants to deal with them."

When approached for comment, Olivia Coleman, a spokesperson for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), declined to provide specific details regarding the expanded information sharing or its legal underpinnings. Instead, she referred to recent public statements by senior administration officials, including Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, who has emphasized the importance of "seamless two-way push communications with our law enforcement partners to facilitate that bi-directional sharing of information."

Historical Context and Evolving Privacy Safeguards

The current policy adjustments echo historical anxieties surrounding the potential for government overreach. Following the Watergate scandal and revelations that Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard Nixon had utilized the CIA for domestic surveillance of anti-war and civil rights activists, public outrage led to significant congressional reforms. These reforms reinforced a long-standing prohibition against intelligence agencies gathering information on the domestic activities of U.S. citizens. Unlike domestic law enforcement agencies, intelligence agencies have historically operated with greater secrecy and less oversight from Congress and the judiciary. Their mandate to collect information on Americans has generally been limited to foreign intelligence investigations, with any exceptions requiring approval from the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence. For instance, the National Security Agency (NSA) possesses the authority to intercept communications between individuals within the U.S. and terror suspects abroad without the stringent probable cause or judicial warrants typically required of law enforcement. The post-9/11 era, in particular, saw an expansion of surveillance authorities in the fight against Islamist terrorism, a development that has been the subject of intense debate across all branches of government.

Civil Liberties Advocates Sound the Alarm

The news of the Trump administration’s initiative to broaden the sharing of law enforcement data with intelligence agencies has been met with alarm by civil liberties advocates. Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon, a senior Democrat on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, expressed his deep concerns in a statement to ProPublica. "The Intelligence Community operates with broad authorities, constant secrecy and little-to-no judicial oversight because it is meant to focus on foreign threats," Senator Wyden stated. He argued that granting intelligence agencies wider access to information on U.S. citizens not suspected of any crime "puts Americans’ freedoms at risk," adding that "the potential for abuse of that information is staggering."

Many current and former government officials interviewed for this report requested anonymity due to the sensitive nature of the matter and fear of reprisal for criticizing the administration’s approach. While most acknowledged the importance of effective information sharing to combat crime and terrorism, they expressed apprehension about the Trump administration’s perceived haste and lack of thorough consideration for privacy implications. This contrasts with previous Republican and Democratic administrations, which, despite grappling with proposed reforms for years, had approached the issue with deliberate weighing of these considerations.

Russell Travers, a former acting director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) who served in senior intelligence roles under both Republican and Democratic administrations, cautioned against a precipitous approach. "There will always be those who simply want to turn on a spigot and comingle all available information, but you can’t just flip a switch – at least not if you want the government to uphold the rule of law," Travers remarked.

A Shift in Counterterrorism and Organized Crime Strategies

The impetus for enhanced information sharing often stems from lessons learned from past failures, such as the intelligence breakdowns preceding the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, which highlighted the CIA’s insufficient intelligence sharing with the FBI. The establishment of the NCTC was a direct consequence of these events, designed to centralize and analyze intelligence on foreign terrorist groups. However, the statutes governing the NCTC explicitly prohibit it from collecting information on domestic terror threats.

In recent years, national security officials have acknowledged significant deficiencies in the government’s management of intelligence related to organized crime groups. In 2011, President Barack Obama issued a national strategy to combat transnational organized crime, stressing the need for improved information sharing. Despite this initiative, only minimal changes were implemented.

President Donald Trump has elevated the urgency of this issue, signing an executive order aimed at dismantling "information silos" of unclassified information. More consequentially, his administration has designated over a dozen Latin American drug mafias and criminal gangs as terrorist organizations. These designations have been used to justify more aggressive measures, including lethal force against suspected drug smugglers.

Some administration officials contend that these terror designations grant intelligence agencies access to all law enforcement case files related to groups like the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel. This interpretation is contentious, as the primary criterion for such designations typically involves a group being "foreign." Unlike international terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda, Latin drug mafias and criminal gangs often have substantial and complex presences within the United States, with many members being U.S. citizens.

Further fueling concerns, in September 2025, the Trump administration designated the loosely organized antifascist political movement, antifa, as a terrorist group, despite the absence of explicit federal statutory authority for such a designation. This was followed by the designation of four European militant groups aligned with antifa as foreign terrorist organizations. Intelligence experts viewed these actions as potentially paving the way for intelligence agencies to monitor Americans who support antifa, raising concerns about free speech rights and echoing historical justifications for domestic spying by the CIA during the Johnson and Nixon administrations, which cited the need to investigate potential foreign government support for government critics.

Disbanding an Office, Consolidating a Database

The push for wider sharing of law enforcement case files is also intertwined with the administration’s abrupt decision to disband the Justice Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF). For decades, OCDETF coordinated interagency efforts on major drug trafficking and organized crime cases. Its dissolution on September 30, 2025, coincided with the establishment of a new network of Homeland Security Task Forces, spearheaded by White House homeland security adviser Stephen Miller. These new task forces are reportedly designed to refocus federal law enforcement agencies on what Miller and other officials have described as an alarming nexus between immigration and transnational crime. This reorganization also grants the White House and the Department of Homeland Security enhanced oversight authority in transnational crime investigations, potentially diminishing the roles of the DEA and federal prosecutors.

A central point of contention in this reorganization is the control of "Compass," OCDETF’s primary database. This database contains approximately 770 million records and serves as the sole central, searchable repository for federal drug trafficking and organized crime case files. Until now, access to Compass has been governed by stringent rules agreed upon by over 20 contributing agencies. While the system was often perceived as cumbersome, it was also credited with fostering interagency cooperation and safeguarding sensitive case files and citizen privacy.

Although the Homeland Security Task Forces have assumed custodianship of the Compass system, the administration’s precise operational plans for the database remain under deliberation. However, intelligence agencies and the Department of Defense have reportedly taken preliminary technical steps to connect their networks to Compass, signaling an intent to access its information should authorization be granted. The White House press office has not responded to inquiries regarding the management of the Compass database and its oversight.

Internal Resistance and Legal Justifications

The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), under its new director Joe Kent, has reportedly been assertive in its pursuit of managing the Compass system. Kent, a former Army Special Forces and CIA paramilitary officer, has previously served as a top aide to Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard. This push has reportedly faced strong opposition from the FBI and DEA. In internal discussions, these law enforcement agencies have argued that it is inappropriate for an intelligence agency to manage sensitive information primarily derived from law enforcement activities. "The NCTC has taken a very aggressive stance," one official observed. "They think the agencies should be sharing everything with them, and it should be up to them to decide what is relevant and what U.S. citizen information they shouldn’t keep."

The FBI declined to comment, while a DEA spokesperson stated the agency is "committed to working with our IC and law enforcement partners to ensure reliable information-sharing and strong coordination to most effectively target the designated cartels."

Even with the Trump administration’s expanded definition of terrorist activity, information pertaining to actual terror groups constitutes a minor portion of the Compass system’s contents. The database includes records from the State Department’s visa operations, U.S. Postal Service inspectors, Treasury Department suspicious transaction reports, and Bureau of Prisons call records. Investigative files from law enforcement agencies often contain information on witnesses, associates of suspects, and individuals who have never committed any crimes.

"You have witness information, target information, bank account information," said Thomas Padden, former OCDETF director. "I can’t think of a dataset that would not be a concern if it were shared without some controls. You need checks and balances, and it’s not clear to me that those are in place."

Officials familiar with interagency discussions indicated that NCTC and other intelligence officials maintain they are solely interested in terror-related information and possess filtering systems to exclude data on U.S. persons. However, FBI and other law enforcement agencies have challenged these assertions, arguing that the NCTC’s proposed access would likely violate privacy laws and compromise sensitive case information without necessarily enhancing the fight against transnational criminals.

The NCTC has reportedly been pressuring the FBI and DEA to share all information related to designated terrorist organizations. The DEA, known for its historically guarded approach to its case files, has reportedly authorized the transfer of at least some of these files, intensifying pressure on the FBI.

Administration lawyers have invoked the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and the 2001 Patriot Act to justify this expanded information sharing. The Patriot Act, in particular, grants law enforcement agencies the power to obtain financial and communication data on individuals certified as having ties to terrorism. However, the NCTC’s mandate, as outlined in its charter, explicitly excludes "intelligence pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorists and domestic counterterrorism." Critics argue that Director Kent and Director of National Intelligence Gabbard are encroaching on established boundaries.

Recent events have drawn scrutiny: In October, Kent drew sharp criticism from the FBI for examining files from an ongoing investigation into the assassination of conservative activist Charlie Kirk. Separately, in November, Director Gabbard appeared to be present during an FBI raid that seized extensive 2020 presidential voting records from an election center in Fulton County, Georgia. Officials later clarified she was dispatched by President Trump but did not oversee the operation.

In prior years, such potential breaches of legal boundaries concerning citizen privacy would have triggered extensive interagency meetings, legal reviews, and policy discussions. The current lack of such deliberation is a significant point of concern for many involved. "We had lengthy interagency meetings that involved lawyers, civil liberties, privacy and operational security types to ensure that we were being good stewards of information and not trampling all over U.S. persons’ privacy rights," noted Travers, the former NCTC director.

The transition from OCDETF to the Homeland Security Task Forces has been described by some involved as lacking a clear understanding of the complexities involved. Agencies contributing data to OCDETF were instructed to transfer their information to the new task forces without assurance that the existing sharing conditions and privacy safeguards would be maintained. Furthermore, there was no encouragement for these agencies to voice such concerns.

While the FBI and DEA have formally objected to changes in data sharing protocols, smaller agencies that contributed records to OCDETF have expressed reluctance to "push back too hard." The NCTC, which faced budget cuts during the Biden administration, has been notably proactive in supporting the new Homeland Security Task Forces, establishing a new fusion center to promote "two-way intelligence sharing of actionable information between the intelligence community and law enforcement," as described by Director Gabbard.

The Pentagon’s new Joint Interagency Task Force-Counter Cartel, based in Tucson, Arizona, also aims to enhance information sharing on trafficking groups. Its announcement noted its collaboration with Homeland Security Task Forces to ensure "sharing all intelligence between our Department of War, law enforcement and Intelligence Community partners."

In the final months of the Biden administration, a similar proposal was put forth by then-DEA Administrator Anne Milgram, which involved creating centers for DEA, CIA, and other agencies to pool information on major Mexican drug trafficking groups. However, this plan encountered strong objections from the Defense Department’s counternarcotics and stabilization office, with officials warning that sharing such law enforcement information with the intelligence community could violate laws prohibiting the CIA from gathering intelligence on Americans within the United States, and that the Pentagon would not participate in such an arrangement.