Department of Justice’s Evolving Stance on Corporate Bribery Under Scrutiny Following $118 Million Millicom Settlement

A significant $118.2 million deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) reached by the Department of Justice (DOJ) with TIGO Guatemala, a unit of telecommunications giant Millicom, on November 10, 2025, has cast a spotlight on the evolving landscape of corporate criminal enforcement, particularly concerning the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). This settlement, stemming from long-standing allegations of overseas bribery, stands in stark contrast to earlier claims by advocacy groups like Public Citizen, which had asserted just months prior that the DOJ was abandoning prosecutions for corporate bribery schemes abroad. Adding to the intrigue, the Justice Department notably refrained from issuing a public press release about the substantial resolution, citing "personnel issues" during a government shutdown – a decision that has raised questions among legal experts and media observers.

The Millicom Settlement: A Closer Look at the $118 Million Resolution

The DPA with TIGO Guatemala concluded a complex investigation into a series of bribery allegations spanning from approximately 2012 to 2018. Under the terms of the agreement, Millicom committed to paying a total of $118.2 million, comprising a $60 million criminal penalty and $58.2 million in forfeiture. This substantial sum addresses illicit payments made to government officials in Guatemala for business favors, a clear violation of the FCPA. Despite the considerable financial penalty and the nature of the charges, the case received minimal attention from mainstream media outlets, a phenomenon partially attributed to the DOJ’s unusual silence on the matter.

Daniel Suleiman, a partner at Covington & Burling in Washington, D.C., who represented Millicom in the case, provided exclusive insights into the resolution and the broader shifts within the Justice Department. He highlighted that the company was granted a two-year deferred prosecution agreement, a term notably shorter than the standard three-year period typically associated with such resolutions. Furthermore, Millicom received an unprecedented fifty percent discount off the bottom of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range, which Suleiman noted is the highest discount ever awarded under the Department’s formalized policies. This exceptional leniency was a direct acknowledgment of the company’s voluntary disclosure of the matter in 2015, its "exceptional cooperation" throughout the protracted investigation, and its "very extensive remediation" efforts, including the implementation of a "top-notch compliance program." Crucially, the DPA did not impose an independent corporate monitor, another significant concession recognizing the company’s robust internal reforms.

Public Citizen’s Critique and the Shifting Sands of FCPA Enforcement

The Millicom settlement emerged just five months after Public Citizen, a prominent consumer advocacy organization, issued a press release on June 10, 2025, provocatively titled "Department of Justice Won’t Prosecute Corporate Bribery Schemes Overseas." This assertion reflected a growing concern among liberal activists that the second Trump administration was systematically curtailing FCPA enforcement, a cornerstone of global anti-corruption efforts.

Suleiman, while acknowledging the rhetoric, offered a more nuanced perspective on the apparent contradiction. He noted that while several cases have indeed been closed without action recently, the Department’s public statements reveal a fascinating policy pivot. He recalled that during his tenure at the DOJ between 2010 and 2013, arguments that the FCPA harmed U.S. business interests, though decades old, had largely been "laid to rest" due to robust enforcement. However, under the current administration, this argument has been "resuscitated, but enshrined in an executive order and in a Department Attorney General memo."

The core of this new policy, as interpreted by Suleiman, suggests that investigations and prosecutions that risk "harming U.S. business interests" may not be pursued. Instead, the focus is intended to shift towards cases that directly "threaten U.S. national security," involve "cartels and transnational criminal organizations," or "otherwise disadvantage U.S. business interests." This represents a significant philosophical departure, effectively giving renewed weight to arguments that had previously been rejected in favor of aggressive anti-bribery enforcement.

Behind the Scenes: The DOJ’s Uncharacteristic Silence

One of the most perplexing aspects of the Millicom resolution was the DOJ’s decision not to issue a press release. Typically, settlements of this magnitude, particularly in high-profile areas like FCPA enforcement, are accompanied by official announcements to inform the public and underscore the Department’s commitment to combating corporate crime. The DOJ attributed this omission to "personnel issues raised during the government shutdown," which coincided with the settlement’s public disclosure on November 10.

However, this explanation has been met with skepticism. As noted in the original reporting, the Department reportedly issued press releases for "much less significant cases" during the same shutdown period, suggesting an inconsistency in its communication strategy. The lack of an official announcement meant that the Millicom case, despite its size and implications for FCPA policy, largely "fell through the cracks" of mainstream media reporting, which often relies on such official notifications. This lack of transparency, intentional or not, limited public and corporate awareness of a significant enforcement action and the rationale behind its terms. While the resolution papers are eventually cataloged on the FCPA Unit’s website, the absence of an immediate, public announcement diminishes its immediate impact and public understanding.

A Case’s Long Journey: The Millicom Chronology

Understanding the Millicom resolution requires appreciating its extensive timeline, a factor Suleiman emphasized as crucial for evaluating any corporate enforcement action under a new administration. The case did not originate with the current administration but rather began as a "voluntary disclosure" by Millicom in 2015 to both the Department of Justice and Swedish authorities. Both investigations were initially closed, with the DOJ concluding its inquiry in 2018.

However, the case took a turn in or around 2020 when the Department of Justice "gained new information and reopened the investigation." Millicom then disclosed receiving a subpoena in the spring of 2022. This lengthy gestation period underscores a critical point: many significant corporate criminal investigations, particularly complex white-collar cases involving international conduct, require years to develop and resolve. They involve extensive document review, forensic accounting, interviews, and often require obtaining evidence from overseas jurisdictions. Consequently, resolutions occurring in the early months of a new administration often reflect the investigative momentum and policy priorities of prior administrations, rather than the immediate impact of new directives. The Millicom case, initiated long before the current administration took office, serves as a prime example of this lag effect.

The Broader Landscape of Corporate Criminal Enforcement

The Millicom case and Suleiman’s observations paint a picture of a Justice Department in transition. The "second Trump administration" has seen considerable personnel turnover, with many experienced prosecutors departing the FCPA unit and other white-collar enforcement divisions. This attrition inevitably creates an impact, as it takes time for new policy priorities to "trickle down" and for new personnel to gain experience and build new cases.

While the administration has made "significant policy pronouncements" about the types of cases it intends to pursue – emphasizing national security, cartels, and protecting U.S. business interests – Suleiman believes these new initiatives have "not been executed yet" in terms of generating new, administration-initiated cases. The current resolutions, like Millicom’s, largely represent the culmination of investigations initiated years ago. This suggests that the full impact of the new policy directives on the volume and nature of corporate criminal enforcement will only become evident in the coming years, as the pipeline of older cases diminishes and new investigations, aligned with the revised priorities, are brought to fruition.

Furthermore, the practice of resolving corporate criminal cases has fundamentally shifted over the past forty years. What was once primarily a binary choice between a guilty plea or a trial has evolved, with deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) and non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) becoming the dominant outcomes. Suleiman views this as a "net positive," arguing that a guilty plea for a corporation, particularly in regulated industries, can be a "fatal deal," leading to severe collateral consequences beyond the immediate financial penalty. DPAs and NPAs, he contends, allow for corporate accountability – often involving significant financial penalties and compliance requirements – without the "stain of a felony conviction." Corporations, unlike individuals, cannot be imprisoned, making the punitive aspects of a guilty plea less directly applicable. This more "nuanced" approach aims to hold companies accountable while preserving their ability to operate, thereby protecting jobs and economic stability, a perspective that aligns with the current administration’s stated emphasis on protecting U.S. business interests.

The "Two-Tiered Justice" Debate: A Nuanced Perspective

The discussion around corporate criminal enforcement often leads to the broader debate about a "two-tiered system of justice," where individuals, particularly those facing violent or street crimes, appear to be treated more harshly than corporations or white-collar criminals. As an attorney who represents both corporate clients and indigent individuals in pro bono work, Daniel Suleiman offered a unique perspective on this perception.

Suleiman cautioned against a direct comparison between individual prosecutions for violent crimes and corporate criminal enforcement, describing it as "comparing apples and oranges." He argued that a corporation "stands in fundamentally different shoes from any individual." A corporation comprises thousands of employees and other individuals, many of whom may have had absolutely no involvement in the misconduct under investigation, which might have occurred in a specific subsidiary or unit. Moreover, the fundamental difference remains: "You can’t put a corporation in prison."

Instead, Suleiman posited that the more salient "two-tiered system" is often observed between "indigent individuals and individuals who can afford higher priced counsel." This perspective highlights disparities in access to legal resources and quality of defense, rather than an inherent difference in how the justice system treats legal entities versus human beings. While acknowledging the critical importance of robust defense for all individuals, particularly in the "true trenches of the criminal justice system" in state court violent crime cases, he maintained that the objectives and consequences of corporate versus individual prosecutions are inherently distinct.

Implications and Future Outlook

The Millicom settlement, while resolving an older case, offers crucial insights into the present state and future direction of corporate criminal enforcement under the current administration. It signals that while rhetoric may suggest a retreat from FCPA enforcement, actual cases, particularly those initiated prior to new policy shifts, continue to result in significant penalties. However, the unprecedented leniency in the form of a record discount and a shorter DPA term, alongside the DOJ’s quiet handling of the announcement, indicates a potential shift towards a more corporate-friendly enforcement environment, especially for companies demonstrating robust cooperation and remediation.

The evolving policy that prioritizes cases threatening national security or involving transnational crime over those that might harm U.S. business interests represents a significant departure from decades of established practice. As the Justice Department continues to grapple with personnel changes and the implementation of these new directives, the coming years will be critical in determining the true impact on the volume and nature of FCPA prosecutions and corporate criminal enforcement more broadly. Observers will be keenly watching whether new cases brought by this administration align with these stated priorities, and how future resolutions will balance accountability with the protection of perceived U.S. economic interests. The Millicom case serves as a powerful reminder that the chapter on corporate criminal defense under this administration is indeed "still very much being written."